The Court analyzed the 90-day requirement before it by taking into account its statutory context. At a general level, Federal District Courts are given original jurisdiction of all civil actions brought by the United States, "except as otherwise provided by Act of Congress." And, more specifically, Congress had granted United States district courts "original jurisdiction exclusive of the courts of the States, of any action or proceeding for the recovery or enforcement of any fine, penalty, or forfeiture ... incurred under any act of Congress."
One such act is the Controlled Substances Act, which includes a provision specifying that money used to buy illegal drugs or that represents the proceeds from their sale "shall be subject to forfeiture to the United States." The provision contemplated that such forfeitures may be accomplished through either criminal or civil proceedings. And when the United States elects to proceed civilly, the procedural rules provided by 18 U.S.C. Section 983 govern the proceeding.
The Court observed that Section 983, entitled "General rules for civil forfeiture proceedings," was enacted in 2000 as part of the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000. This Section requires, for example, that when notice is required to be given to interested parties, the Government must generally send the notice within 60 days of seizing the property. It also establishes how an individual who receives such a notice or any other person claiming property seized in an administrative forfeiture proceeding may file a claim to the property. Additionally, it provides that once an individual makes such a claim, the Government must file its civil forfeiture complaint in court or take other specified action in pursuing forfeiture within 90 days. Specifically, that provision states with respect to civil forfeiture:
Not later than 90 days after a claim has been filed, the Government shall file a complaint for forfeiture in the manner set forth in the Supplemental Rules for Certain Admiralty and Maritime Claims or return the property pending the filing of a complaint, except that a court in the district in which the complaint will be filed may extend the period for filing a complaint for good cause shown or upon agreement of the parties.
If the Government does not file a complaint or take other action within 90 days as required, it must "release the property pursuant to regulations promulgated by the Attorney General, and may not take any further action to effect the civil forfeiture of such property in connection with the underlying offense." In this statutory context, the court stated that “it readily appears that the provisions of Section 983 are procedural rules for pursuing the forfeiture of seized assets. The subject matter jurisdiction for forfeiture is conferred by 28 U.S.C. Section 1355(a); the authority to forfeit is provided by 21 U.S.C. Section 881(a)(6); and the rules of procedure for pursuing a civil forfeiture are provided by 18 U.S.C. Section 983. But, as already noted, procedural rules can be made conditions of subject matter jurisdiction if Congress clearly so indicates.
The Court held that, based on several considerations, that Congress had not indicated, clearly or otherwise, that the procedural rule of Section 983(a)(3) is a condition of jurisdiction. First, Section 983(a)(3)'s language does not suggest, let alone clearly indicate, that District Courts lack adjudicatory authority over a civil forfeiture complaint that was filed late by the Government. To be sure, Section 983(a)(3) does contain a mandatory limitation requiring the Government's prosecutor to file its complaint not later than 90 days after a claim has been filed. But that limitation is imposed on the Executive Branch of Government, not as a condition of the court's authority. Stated otherwise, the provision "does not speak in jurisdictional terms or refer in any way to the jurisdiction of the District Courts." Second, the fact that the provision allows "a court in the district in which the complaint will be filed to extend the period for filing a complaint for good cause shown or upon agreement of the parties," 18 U.S.C. § 983(a)(3)(A), undercuts any argument that the deadline is jurisdictional. Congress does not typically allow an agreement of the parties to define the scope of the district court's authority to hear a case.
Third, Section 983(a)(3) provides that if the Government fails to file its complaint or take other specified action within the 90-day period, the Government must release the property and loses any right to pursue it further. While Congress undertook to provide a sanction for the failure to comply with its terms, in doing so, it did not provide or suggest that the court loses subject matter jurisdiction as a result of noncompliance.
Fourth and finally, the 90-day deadline "is located in a provision `separate' from those granting federal courts subject-matter jurisdiction over" forfeiture actions.
Therefore, the court held that, “the Federal District Courts are explicitly given subject matter jurisdiction over civil forfeiture actions by 28 U.S.C. Section 1345, which confers jurisdiction over civil actions brought by the United States, and by 28 U.S.C. Section 1355(a), which grants jurisdiction more specifically over civil forfeiture actions.
Further, if Congress had intended that the failure to meet the 90-day deadline be jurisdictional, it surely could have so indicated by stating that the court would lose jurisdiction if the deadline were not met. Indeed, the fact that Congress elected to include a specific sanction against the government without expressing any limitation on the district court's adjudicatory authority suggests that the provision should not be treated as jurisdictional. The statute imposes a 90-day deadline on the Government and provides the sanction that the property will be released if the Government does not meet its deadline.
Conclusively, the court held that the 90-day deadline imposed in Section 983(a)(3) is not jurisdictional and that therefore Wilson forfeited his limitations argument by not raising it during the forfeiture proceedings.
Notably, whereas unlawful arrest does not result in the suppression of the "body" of the Defendant in a criminal proceeding, the unlawful seizure of property does not result in the suppression of that property in a forfeiture proceeding. Suffice to say, “the illegal seizure of property does not immunize that property from forfeiture as long as the government can sustain the forfeiture claim with independent evidence".
