1 R (Appellant) v Ahmad and Another, R (Respondent) v Fields and Others (Appellants) [2014] UKSC 36

Case Caption:

On appeal from: [2012] EWCA Crim 391; [2013] EWCA Crim 2042

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Summary Significance:

Approaches for post-conviction confiscation where not all convicts benefited and the manner of sharing responsibility where an order for confiscation is made against Defendants jointly.

Applicable laws:

• Section 6, 7, 9, 76, 79 and 84 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (United Kingdom).
• The Proceeds of Crime Act 1988 (United Kingdom).

Brief Facts:

This is a consolidated appeal at the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom on 18th June, 2014. In the first appeal, the appellants, Shakeel Ahmad and Syed Ahmed (ā€œthe Ahmad defendantsā€) were convicted by a jury for fraud and sentenced to seven years in prison. The Appellants were involved in the carousel fraud, which involved criminally misusing the collection system of Value Added Tax (ā€œVATā€) to extract money from the revenue authorities. The Ahmad defendants had been the sole directors and shareholders of a company known as MST, which dealt in computer central processing units (ā€œCPUsā€), which were zero rated for VAT purposes on import to the United Kingdom. The fraud involved five companies in Ireland, which, in a total of 32 transactions during April 2002, purported to export large quantities of CPUs to five companies in the UK, each of whom was either a registered company which went ā€œmissingā€ or a genuine company the identity of which was hijacked by the fraudsters. The missing trader then ostensibly sold the goods to a company known as GW224, which then sold the goods on to MST. In the second appeal, the three appellants, Michael Fields, Mitesh Sanghani and Karamjit Sagoo (ā€œthe Fields defendantsā€), and a fourth man, Wasim Rajput, were found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to defraud over a period between January and June 2005. The Fields defendants were each sentenced to five years in prison, and Mr Rajput was imprisoned for thirty months. The fraud was said by the prosecution to involve two other men who were acquitted, and one other man as to whose guilt the jury was unable to agree. The Fields defendants were described by the trial judge, as being ā€œat the heart of the fraudā€, and that it was ā€œa joint operation between themā€, whereas Mr Rajput’s position was accepted by the judge as being more peripheral. The fraudulent conspiracy involved the use of a company called Mercury Distributions Ltd (ā€œMDLā€), whose published accounts for the years 2002/3 and 2003/4 falsely recorded that it had over Ā£1m in fixed assets. It was appreciated that potential customers of MDL would be likely to check the accounts before committing themselves to doing business with it and granting credit. Premises were obtained by Mr Sagoo in February 2005, with the assistance of false trade references. From then on, MDL engaged in fraudulent trading, applying to buy goods or obtain services on credit, which resulted in credit checks which indicated that it was financially healthy. As a result, credit agreements were approved, and goods and services were supplied by around 35 businesses, but no payments were ever made and, at least for the most part, the goods disappeared. The Fields defendants were each instrumental in this fraudulent activity. Mr Rajput was much less closely involved.

Issues for Determination:

I. Whether each of the appellants should be separately liable for the whole of that amount.
II. Whether the defendants benefited.
III. If yes, what is the value of the benefit?
IV. What is the sum payable?

Holding:

According to Section 76(4) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a person benefits from conduct if they obtain property as a result of or in connection with that conduct. The court interpreted the word "obtains" as crucial in determining benefit. It means that the defendant must have obtained property to own it, indicating a power of disposition or control over it. The court emphasized that when a person obtains property through criminal means, they may not become the legal owner of that property. They may only have possessory control or interest in it, which has no significant value. The court held that there was evidence of fraud and the defendants played a significant role in it. The court concluded that the property had been obtained by the conspirators, particularly the principal conspirators, which included the defendants. In resolution of question 2, the Lords took notice of the provision of Section 79 (1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 which states that the value has to be the market value, and that Section 84 (2) (b) contains an injunction to assume that each of defendants has obtained the whole property. In the First Appeal, the HoL concluded that the Court of Appeal was right to conclude that each of the Ahmad defendants obtained $16.1m (after adjusting for inflation) as property and that that was the value of their benefit. In the second Appeal, the Lords stated that, as David LJ noted, there was no appeal against the judge’s finding that the Fields defendants jointly obtained a benefit of worth $1,6m (after adjusting for inflation), and in those circumstances, it follows that he was right to hold that the benefit to be valued in respect of each defendants was the whole amount of the property obtained. In this case, the Ahmad defendants, did not dispute that they had each benefited from the jointly obtained property. However, they argued that any payment made by one defendant under the confiscation order should reduce or eliminate the amount payable by the other defendant, based on the principle of A1P1 (Protocol 1, Article 1) of the European Convention on Human Rights. The argument was that taking the same proceeds of crime twice would not serve the legitimate aim of the legislation and would be disproportionate. The court considered the provisions of A1P1 in relation to the 2002 Act and the holding in R v Gangar [2012] EWCA Crim 1378; [2013] 1 WLR 147 and found the Defendants; argument to be compelling. Taking the same proceeds twice would not serve the legislative aim, and it would be disproportionate. The violation of A1P1 would occur when the state seeks to enforce an order for the confiscation of proceeds that have already been paid to the state. To avoid such a violation, the court determined that the confiscation order should be subject to a condition preventing the enforcement of the order to the extent that a sum has already been recovered under another confiscation order relating to the same joint benefit.

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